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The United States Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA) of 2002 had an effect on 
Mexico well before economic projections on those effects were made public, or even considered.  
The Mexican Congress set to explore the ensuing problem immediately after FSRIA was enacted.  
The overwhelming public perception was that FSRIA would unfairly limit the competitiveness of 
Mexican producers against their US counterparts.  This came at a time of increasing public 
awareness of the removal of barriers to agricultural imports coming from the United States and 
Canada, due January 1
st, 2003 under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  The 
Agro-Food Armor (Blindaje Agroalimentario) was the Mexican government’s original response to 
the 2002 FRSIA Act.  The National Agreement for the Countryside (Acuerdo Nacional para el 
Campo) is a much broader response of Mexican rural society.  But the final outcome of the Act on 
Mexico is still very much uncertain.  The past year has brought about substantial changes in 
Mexican agricultural policies, and politics.
2  Now that the effects of FSRIA are being discussed, its 
effect on Mexican agriculture must be the object of political as much as economic analysis. 
  
 
Projections on policy changes 
 
The 2002 Act is expected to have “minimal impact” on US agriculture and trade.
3  Maize, wheat 
and sorghum exports in 2003 will increase between 2 and 3 percent over the 2001 Baseline.  
These three crops are the main US grain exports to Mexico, but it is still unclear whether Mexico 
will absorb part of the projected increases in US exports.  FAPRI’s November 2002 Baseline 
Projections for Mexico do differ from its 2001 Baseline, but differences seem to depend on 
changed initial conditions more than anything else.
4  It is perhaps warranted to focus a more 
detailed discussion of projections for Mexico on the case of maize.  Maize makes up 40 percent of 
Mexican grain imports from the United States, and it accounts for 50 percent of all arable land.  
Despite pre-NAFTA forecasts, maize acreage in Mexico reached an all-time high in 2001, due in 
part to the doubling of irrigated acreage since 1990, including a two-fold increase in the state of 
Sinaloa.  Price supports for maize in Sinaloa explain why maize acreage in this state makes up 28 
percent of the national total.  They are also essential in explaining changes in the composition of 
agricultural output during the past ten years.
5 
 
                                                 
1 Paper presented at the Ninth Mexico/Canada/US Agricultural and Food Policy Information Workshop. Montreal, April 
23-26, 2003. 
2 See Rosenzweig, 2003. Changes in Mexican agricultural policies, 2001-2003.  
3 See Kruse, 2003. Implications of the 2002 U.S. Farm Act for world agriculture. 
4 FAPRI, 2001. FAPRI 2001 U.S. and world agricultural outlook.  
5 See De Ita, 2003. Los impactos socioeconómicos y ambientales de la liberación commercial de los granos básicos 
en el contexto del TLCAN: El caso de Sinaloa. FAPRI’s November 2002 Baseline Projections adjust Mexican maize imports downward, in the 
short run, from its 2001 Baseline; but projections converge for the 07/08 cropping cycle, when 
imports are expected to reach 6.53 billion metric tons (bmt), slightly above the 96/97 historical 
maximum.  USDA projections are even more optimistic, reaching an all-time high as early as this 
year.  FAPRI’s, USDA’s and FAO’s estimates suggest continuous growth in maize imports for the 
rest of the decade, reaching up to 8.50 bmt by 2010.  These projections appear to be based on the 
actual level of imports during the last few years, and not on stated Mexican trade policy, i.e., tariff 
rate quotas (TRQs).  The difference between these two can be substantial: while the TRQ for 2001 
was 3.08 bmt, imports reached 6.14 bmt that year.  The Mexican government has allowed tariff-
free maize imports to exceed TRQs nearly every year since 1994, arguing that imports 
“complement” domestic maize production in meeting growing demand, and saying that quotas are 




The Agro-Food Armor 
 
In September 2002, Agriculture Secretary Usabiaga offered opposition members of the Senate a 
preview of the Agro-Food Armor.  The meeting was positive, according to both sides.
7  Indeed, the 
Armor is marked by consultations between the branches of government and the political parties in 
the spirit of the new Rural Development Law.  In October, the opposition governors of Zacatecas 
(PRD) and Tamaulipas (PRI) touted the Armor.  It was also announced that month that subsidies to 
fuel, electricity and fertilizers would be part of the Armor, as well as additional prices supports.  The 
Armor was meant to be a one-on-one response (ley espejo) to the higher subsidies across the 
border after the FSRIA Act.
8  The President assured producers the Armor would provide “enough” 
subsidies to Mexican producers across the board. 
 
The document describing the Armor—published in November—explains the government’s 
response as an effort to integrate production chains (cadenas productivas) and to look 
independently after the needs of all segments of the chain.
9   In the case of maize, this means 
tending to producers as well as to the livestock sector and agro industry.  The price-sensitive 
livestock sector is reportedly largely responsible for the increased demand for maize in the past 
few years.  The government’s decision to exceed the TRQs for maize is partly based on the need 
to satisfy this industry’s demand.  The Armor ensures that this sector will continue to benefit from 
low international prices.  It promotes contracts between agricultural and livestock producers and 
subsidizes the contract price at the international price plus transportation costs.  At the same time, 
it seeks to protect agricultural producers through a target-price scheme.  PROCAMPO’s fixed per-
hectare payment is increased in real terms to the highest level since 1996.  The Armor also allows 
for the conversion of PROCAMPO into a per-ton payment that contributes towards the target-price.  
The precise mechanism will be defined later this year.  Thus, the Armor is designed to let industry 
respond to variations in international prices while protecting growers from those fluctuations.  It 
also extends price supports to all regions with market surpluses, in an apparent effort to satisfy 
                                                 
6 La Jornada, April 30, 2002. 
7 SAGARPA, 2002. Boletín 322-2002. Manifiestan senadores del PRD que es necesario avanzar en la política 
presupuestal para que el campo resuelva sus problemas estructurales. 
8 La Jornada, August 9, 2002. 
9 See SAGARPA, 2002. Acciones de Política Agroalimentaria y Pesquera para el Fortalecimiento Sectorial, November. domestically as much of local demand as possible.  The Armor tends to subsistence producers by 
increasing PROCAMPO payments for producers with less than five (rain-fed) hectares beyond the 
regular rate, and rounding up to one hectare the minimum payment. 
 
The Armor also calls for the organization of small, low-productivity producers.  It calls for 
permanent consultations with productive organizations, and for the participation of rural society in 
public policy through the Consejo Mexicano de Desarrollo Rural Sustentable, thirty two Consejos 
Estatales and countless Consejos Municipales.  When, right before the scheduled publication of 
the Armor, some members of rural society did express an opinion, Secretary Usabiaga called them 
“opportunists” looking for political gains.
10  A week later and one day before Mexico’s Finance 
Secretary discussed the budget proposal in the Lower House, President Fox announced the Armor 
would be backed by $103 billon pesos.  The money “is not subsidies,” he cautioned.
11  We are not 
back into protectionism, said Usabiaga.  Criticism did not wait a single day.  Producer organizations 
laid the administration’s claims bare saying the Armor contained no resources in addition to the 
original budget.  “The government disguises the Armor,” read the headline in right-leaning 
Reforma.  Private growers and the social sector agreed for a moment: the proposed budget falls 
well short of what is needed to face competition.  Armando Paredes, president of Consejo Nacional 
Agropecuario (CNA—the main association of private growers), said at least M$15 billion more was 
needed in subsidies to support commercial Mexican growers against subsidies to US farmers. 
Yeidckol Polevnsky, president of CANACINTRA, warned against taking “what is needed” from 
support to other sectors.
12  Next day, in Congress, estimates of additional resources needed 
ranged from M$40 to 100 billion, yet PRI and PAN legislators pledged to pass the budget by 
December 15
th.  A House member from PRD announced later in the day that the proposal of the 
Ley de Egresos included roughly $17 billion pesos in “subsidies” yet to be allocated.  A 
compromise to reign-in the deficit made the weeks that followed a zero-sum-game between private 
growers and the social sector.   
 
Producers openly began to question the rationale for free agricultural trade due on New Year’s 
Day.  Prominent PRI and PAN members of the Senate joined the chorus, warning that NAFTA’s 
implementation could lead to social unrest, and openly suggesting the need to renegotiate NAFTA.  
In a move that must have surprised his own party, Senator Jones (PAN) declared that talk of 
withdrawal from NAFTA should compel Mexico’s trading partners to seek common ground. 
Sensing growing dissent in government ranks, business leaders and former president Salinas 
came out in defense of the trade agreement. The president of COPARMEX hinted that competitive 
northern producers needed help to overcome competition from abroad, essentially dismissing 
social-sector producers as being hopelessly behind the times. 
 
The budget was finally approved on schedule.  Congress, the Administration, and the political 
parties congratulated themselves and each other for the political process and its results.  The 
leader of PRI in the House congratulated his party and defined “state governments and the 
countryside” as PRI’s priorities.  The leader of PAN touted the lawmaking process and set the 
agenda for the year: energy, labor, telecommunications and State reforms.
13  The Secretary of 
                                                 
10 Reforma, November 14, 2002. 
11 The final budget includes M$38 billion in subsidies. 
12 Reforma, November 18, 2002. 
13 Reforma, December 16, 2002. Finance was also pleased.  M$20 billion—unclaimed from the Retirement Savings System—had 
been “borrowed” to adjust the budget without increasing the deficit: M$11 billion were apportioned 
to the new Financiera Rural; M$8 billion to rural-sector programs.  A total 13.1 billion were 
reallocated to the countryside.  State governments and the Ministry of Agriculture were the main 
recipients of reprogrammed resources.  Moreover, after a visit from US-embassy personnel, the 
Senate froze its proposal to suspend the agricultural chapter in NAFTA (suspension provisional del 
capitulo agropecuario del TLCAN).  The CNA expressed its satisfaction with this decision and 
declared its own demands had been satisfied.
14  Felipe Hinojosa, leader of PAN, called the budget 
negotiations “a message of political stability.”  The transition from Banrural to Financiera Rural 
proceeded in the days that followed, but Financiera Rural would no longer be committed to serving 
the social sector.  Indeed, the “social sector” had not been appeased with the new budget.   The 
day the budget was approved, the Congreso Agrario Permanente (CAP) and 14 other peasant 
organizations sent a letter to PRI, PAN, PRD and PVM fractions in Congress, stating their 
disillusionment, condemning the intervention of the US Embassy in the Senate, and vowing to take 
international ports of entry on the 1





Relations between the PRI leadership and the Confederacion Nacional Campesina (CNC), its 
peasant organization, have deteriorated over the last fifteen years.  Since 1938, the State had 
provided material benefits (land redistribution, credits, and subsidies) for the CNC rank-and-file 
members and political access for their leaders in exchange for the peasantry's electoral support of 
the PRI.  During the Salinas presidency, the state restructuring, trade liberalization, and Land 
Reform hit at the heart of the PRI-peasant coalition. Poor peasants who considered defecting from 
the PRI to the recently created PRD were co-opted through the Solidaridad program or were 
openly repressed. Salinas' encouragement for the creation of the Congreso Agrario Permanente 
(CAP) undermined the CNC's privileged position as the main intermediary between rural society 
and the government.  The number of autonomous peasant organizations increased considerably 
as they attempted to substitute the disappearing state support agencies. The Zapatista rebellion 
surprised the whole political system and showed how deep peasant dissatisfaction with and 
distrust of government policies had grown.  
 
During the Zedillo administration, the shrinking agricultural support, the non-partisan way in which 
federal social program funds were delivered, and the devolution of financial responsibility for some 
programs to state governments undermined the CNC's ability to claim peasant's loyalties for the 
PRI.  As was ascertained in state governor elections, the political dealignment of rural society 
complemented the already substantial increase in electoral competition. The cases of Chiapas and 
Zacatecas, states with large rural populations, are illustrative: the PRI won the governorships in 
1988 and 1986, respectively, with 90 percent of the vote, and lost them, twelve years later, with 47 
and 39 percent, respectively. Ironically, the PRI's dismal performance in urban areas in the 1997 
and 2000 federal elections left its legislative caucus with over 36 percent of the seats in CNC 
hands, up from an average of 15 percent for the previous twenty years.  This number is not 
necessarily a good measure of the strength the peasant sector may have in defining the party's 
legislative agenda, because the PRI's tradition of political centralization still ensures that the 
                                                 
14 La Jornada, December 17, 2002. agenda be managed by the party president in close coordination with the caucus leader. This may 
be changing since the PRI lost the presidency, which was the linchpin for control of all PRI 
politicians, but it is too early to tell.  
 
In the aftermath of the 2000 defeat and the subsequent internecine struggle for the party 
presidency, Heladio Ramírez, CNC president, sided with the internal status quo coalition and lost 
the gamble. Relations with Roberto Madrazo, the new party president, were icy from the start. The 
CNC's support for President Fox's Acuerdo Politico para el Desarrollo Nacional, which Madrazo 
opposed, did not help to mend them. In late August 2002, Madrazo's support for one of his ally's 
attempt to fight Ramirez's reelection as CNC president in the courts led the entire CNC leadership, 
including the sector's coordinator in the caucus, to publicly break with Madrazo (but stopped short 
of abandoning the PRI).
15  This was the context in which the 2003 budget negotiations started. It 
would not be too far-fetched to surmise that the peasant sector legislators did not enjoy very strong 
backing from their colleagues and that this explains the dissatisfaction with the results.  
 
In the days prior to the passing of the 2003 budget, "dissident" labor organizations, including the 
powerful telephone and electrical workers unions, demonstrating against the new Labor Law met 
independent protests by peasant and teachers unions at the doors of Congress, respectively 
demanding that the agricultural chapter of NAFTA and the education budget reductions not come 
into effect. The violent irruption of the protesters into the legislative chamber alienated the parties' 
caucus chiefs, who initiated legal action against the leaders. It was then that minds started to come 
together for mutual support in civil disobedience acts in early January.  As mentioned above, the 
budget passed without a hitch; however, the last days of the year were spent in a game of 
brinkmanship between the government and the peasant organizations, which threatened to block 
international ports of entry.  In a last minute move to avert the protests, Secretary Usabiaga agreed 
to meet their demands. On the eve of the new year, the Secretaries of Agriculture and Economy 
met a group of CAP leaders associated with Roberto Madrazo, the popular challenger in the PRI 
leadership struggle, with the conspicuous absence of the CNC representative, and part of the El 
Campo groups (El Barzón, UNTA, UNORCA, CNPA) and agreed to delay protests for 20 days 
while they evaluated possible remedial actions and organized a forum to air their problems. 
 
Nevertheless, many other peasant organizations started 2003 conducting civil disobedience acts 
across the country, because they doubted the government's promises of negotiations in early 
February. Negotiations over the agenda, location, and binding character of the newly-named 
Convención Nacional Agropecuaria took place during the first half of the month, amid declarations 
for the suspension of NAFTA by opposition legislators and the governors of Hidalgo and Tlaxcala 
and against it by US-Embassy officials. The government's underhanded attempt to unilaterally 
include the Consejo Nacional Agropecuario (CNA) and other pro-NAFTA organizations in the 
Convención convinced the independent peasant organizations to withdraw from the negotiations. 
The formation of a stable peasant-labor front started taking shape when the UNT declared it was 
joining the peasant's struggle and would promote a work stoppage by the telephone workers as a 
coercive measure. The conflict started attracting the attention of organizations in Canada and the 
United States opposed to NAFTA, which demanded the Mexican government to respond to 
peasants’ demands.
16  Meanwhile, the CNC remained on the sidelines.  Finally, on January 22
nd, 
                                                 
15 El Universal, August 26 and 29, 2002. 
16 La Jornada, January 19, 2003. CAP decided to pull out of negotiations with Usabiaga, dooming the government's attempt to divide 
the protesters. The following days the peasant organizations established contacts with several 
labor unions and summoned a massive protest. The CNC joined the bandwagon at the last 
possible minute. On February 1
st, the largest peasant-led demonstration in Mexico City since the 
Cardenas presidency took place in coordination with labor and teachers unions. The protest broke 
the government's resistance and it immediately agreed to set up a commission composed of the 
Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture and Economy and the representatives of CAP, El Campo, El 
Barzón, and the CNC, to work out the details of negotiations for the Acuerdo Nacional para el 
Campo (ANC). The shockwaves were felt by Mexican legislators, who initiated contacts with US 
Congresspersons in key committees to analyze the possibility of revising agricultural aspects of 
NAFTA.
17  By the middle of the month, CAP, El Barzón and El Campo agreed to set up a formal 
coordination mechanism with UNT. They agreed to march again April 10
th.    
 
In parallel to these developments, the parties started focusing their full attention to selecting 
candidates for the midterm elections. Tensions ran high as President Fox and Roberto Madrazo, 
the new PRI president, exchanged invectives about who was responsible for the lack of structural 
reforms, the growing conflict with the peasants, and Mexico's vote in the U.N. Security Council, 
seeking to gain any advantage in the run up to the elections. Within the PRI, the new party 
leadership was engaged in several conflicts that tore at the seams of the organization. Madrazo's 
underhanded attempts to dislodge the CNC leadership, which had sided with his rivals, led to an 
unsavory public break in relations in late August 2002, and fueled divisions in CAP at year's end. In 
January, the debate over candidate selection methods had the labor sector, a definite loser since 
primary elections were chosen, making (mostly empty) threats to leave the party if it did not get an 
increase in its candidacy quota. CNC leaders weakly supported the Labor colleagues, while they 
maneuvered to leverage their own share of slots with the mobilization of their base supporters in 
February. Madrazo's running mate, a self-confessed close friend of Fox, bargained with the 
administration of her own accord. The seventeen PRI governors, four CNC-affiliates among them, 
and six governor candidates threw their weight around to position their allies in the proportional 
representation lists in March. The fight over the CNC leadership has played into the designation of 
the PRI proportional representation lists in late April, when a bullish pro-Madrazo governor vetoed 
the inclusion of the CNC representative in CAP and, instead, favored leaders of rival CAP 
organizations. To make things unbearable all along, the federal electoral authority conducted an 
investigation of the party's illegal funding of the 2000 presidential campaign and decided to slap a 
huge fine on the party, on the ides of March. 
 
The rest of the parties were undergoing their own strains to fill nominations. In the PRD, as is 
usually the case with this party, its bureaucratic factions connived to block the central leadership's 
proposals and distributed the slots among themselves. Therefore, around 80 candidacies were 
reserved for non-party members, leaders of like-minded social organizations. In this case, El 
Barzón and El Campo people benefited from these alliances. The Partido del Trabajo did the same 





                                                 
17 La Jornada, February 9, 2003. National Agreement for the Countryside (ANC) 
 
Serious negotiations for the ANC started in March, when the Comisión de Organización y 
Acuerdos was formed by eight peasant leaders and several secretaries of state.  The starting 
points were a vague statement by both sides that a structural reform of the countryside was 
needed, and a commitment to end negotiations by the start of electoral campaigns April 15
th.  
Demands brought by peasant organizations into the agenda included renegotiation of debt, multi-
annual budgets, food sovereignty, biosafety regulation, defense of international workers, 
reprogramming of the 2002 budget among existing programs, fresh resources in the form of an 
emergency fund, and, plainly, renegotiation of NAFTA.  One of the first agreements, promoted by 
the government, was to drop discussion of renegotiating NAFTA and seek protection for maize and 
beans through Parallel Agreements with NAFTA partners.  The dialogue was soon transformed into 
a game of semantics, as peasant leaders—and the press—tried to understand what was being 
negotiated and what the government was offering. 
 
Confusion first developed around what the Emergency Fund would include. Peasant leaders were 
clear that what they wanted was “fresh resources,” but the government refused to use the word 
“emergency” —lest it be confused with natural disasters—and insisted on referring to the state of 
things as an “adverse situation.”  The organizations’ bid for the Fund started at M$20 billion—the 
extra revenue coming into the Treasury from higher-than-expected oil prices.  But it was soon 
realized that oil revenue had already been committed by the budget’s Ley de Egresos.  The 
government’s initial offer for the Fund was M$2.8 billion.  Then, as the April 10
th march drew closer, 
the press reported startling increases in the government’s offer. First, it was M$5.0 billion for the 
Fund and M$55 billion to be reallocated within the original budget; the day before the march it was 
M$17.6 billion for the Fund and M$66 billion to be reallocated.  It turned out that most of the offer 
for the Fund was already part of the budget and only M$1.58 was “fresh resources.”  The PRI 
fraction in Congress suggested declaring a state of emergency in the countryside to ease the 
negotiations.    
 
Another source of confusion was what the Parallel Agreements would accomplish.  Leaders were 
heeding to proposals on this matter in the understanding that the government had agreed to 
maintaining tariffs for maize and beans beyond 2008.  To some, this was synonymous with 
excluding maize and beans from NAFTA.  The press reported the government would renegotiate 
NAFTA to exclude maize and beans, and the government denied it.  The president’s remarks on 
April 22
nd to the foreign-press corps, in his first public appearance in a month, has done little to 
solve the confusion: Mexico, the United States and Canada will revise NAFTA in coming months, 
he said, adding that maize and beans would be “better positioned within the rules of NAFTA.”  The 
Comisión de Redacción has understandably played an important role in the ANC and a final draft is 
still pending.  However, both sides have already signed the latest draft
18—vowing to remain behind 
current agreements—and declared an end to negotiations. Signing of the ANC has been scheduled 
for April 28
th to allow organization leaders to read the final draft.     
 
In balance, peasant organizations have achieved a number of concessions to be addressed 
through the M$2.80 billion Emergency Fund.  PROCAMPO will include an additional M$100 per 
                                                 
18 Acuerdo Nacional para el Campo: Por el desarrollo de la sociedad rural, la soberanía y seguridad alimentarias, 
Propuesta. Abril 20, 2003.  hectare for producers with less than 5 hectares; the Solidaridad Entrepreneurial Fund (FONAES) 
and the Temporary Work Program will be expanded, and so will other programs benefiting the 
poorest segments of rural society.  Another part of the Fund will be devoted to solving longstanding 
agrarian conflicts.  The ANC also calls for the Comisión de Acuerdos y Organización to revise 
existing program rules to “reorient resources” more progressively among producers.  The amounts 
involved are not explicit in the latest draft of the ANC, but Interior Secretary Creel has reportedly 
set the total around M$20 billion.
19  Debt relief is another important aspect of the agreement.  As 
mentioned by President Fox, the ANC calls for the three NAFTA partners to revise the agreement 
as regards white maize and beans with the goal of implementing a “permanent import 
administration mechanism.”  Import quotas for white maize will be suspended immediately.  As 
regards import quotas for other products, including yellow maize, the ANC states that the 
government will “consult with producer organizations, peasants and agro industry” to design a 
policy that takes into account TRQs and domestic demand in order to strictly limit quotas to satisfy 
excess demand.   
 
Reaction to the ANC is wide ranging.  Heladio Ramírez, CNC leader, called it a first-of-its-kind 
event.  Victor Suarez, El Campo spokesman, called it a win-win agreement that might prevent 
social unrest if fulfilled.  Rafael Galindo, CAP, and Alfonso Ramírez, El Barzón, were more 
cautious.  A bitter editorial in Reforma calls the ANC a blow on taxpayers, a victory for 
organizations, and a scam for peasants.  An editorial in La Jornada calls it a minor concession on 
the part of government that might as well be the outcome of the current balance of power.  If 
money is indeed the prism through which historians can observe daily political events,
20 the ANC 
could come out as a relatively minor event.  The M$2.80 billion Emergency Fund pales in 
comparison with the M$113 billion budget for rural development in 2003, and the reorientation of 
the existing budget is yet to be decided.  As regards NAFTA, the salient feature of the accord to 
revise this agreement and import quota allocations is that vagueness of its binding character and 
its conformity with existing government policy.   With the ANC, the government commits to consult 
the 2004 budget proposal with peasant organizations and to maintain agreed changes to program 
rules.  However, the influence these organizations can have on actual policy will depend on 
Congress.  
 
The newfound capacity of peasant organizations for coordinated action is something that 
opposition parties cannot afford to pass up.  In the short run, these parties will try to harness this 
effervescence by supplying peasant leaders with candidacies to Congress. This is something the 
ruling party is hopelessly incapable of doing.  While it may have the sympathies of some, if not 
most, commercial producers, it surely has lost any appeal with the rest of the rural population. The 
PRI leadership will be hard-pressed to make amends with the CNC, lest its members decide that 
there are better opportunities elsewhere. However, the fact that it selected a third of its single-
member district legislative candidates through primaries in the midst of the mobilizations for the 
ANC may benefit the CNC's prospects of strengthening its internal position. As for the PRD, it 
faces the chance of a lifetime to debunk the PRI from the still dominant place it holds among that 
section of the population. In a closely related matter, four of this year's six gubernatorial races take 
place in states with sizeable rural populations. PAN's chances of sweeping these elections will 
probably be compromised; PRI will most likely keep or take back most of them. Next year's ten 
                                                 
19 El Financiero, February 15, 2003. 
20 Zebadúa, E. Banqueros y revolucionarios: La soberanía financiera de México. races are probably too far removed in time to be directly influenced by this year's events, but 
success may breed success. 
 
This competition is beneficial for the salience peasant demands will enjoy in the next Congress. 
For one, parties will have to think twice before regarding rural concerns lightly. While the 
constitutional ban on immediate re-election hampers accountability to constituents, Mexican voters 
have shown that they can deliver rewards and punishments based on parties' past record. Also, 
depending on the election's results, peasants' representatives may actually have better leverage to 
bargain budgets and amendments to laws. This may depend also on whether any party wins the 
majority, which seems unlikely. Cooperation across party lines will be easier to accomplish in this 
scenario, which opens the door for rural representatives to pull together. 
 
Lastly, peasants' success in bringing the federal government to the negotiating table speaks highly 
of their standing as social actors. All too often, they had been dismissed as an endangered 
species, politically apathetic and socially atomized. The recent events show that class identity is 
alive and well in rural Mexico. Also, the alliances that independent peasant and labor organizations 
are establishing enhance the class nature of Mexican politics, so long disguised and denied by the 
PRI. To President Fox's chagrin, by ousting the PRI from the presidency and setting that party's 
corporatist organizations free, he can take credit in helping create the political conditions that 
allowed these actors to mount a concerted challenge to his policies. However much Fox is 
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